Steering consumers to lenders in residential real estate markets
利用房产挂牌数据，研究发现房地产经纪人会要求贷款购房者从卖方偏好的贷款机构获取预审信，这种引导行为多见于法拍房交易，虽提高成交概率，但可能排挤依赖贷款融资的购房者。
Abstract Using novel data on property listings that allow us to observe private information exchanges between real estate agents, we identify bidding constraints requiring financed buyers to obtain a prequalification letter from a seller‐preferred lender even if the buyers have been prequalified with other lenders. More than half of the steering activity is driven by sellers of foreclosed properties. We find evidence that steering increases the likelihood of sale but not that it drives borrowers to take out high‐cost or complex mortgages. However, steering‐kickback arrangements potentially crowd out buyers who rely on mortgage financing.