Intermediation and Steering: Competition in Prices and Commissions
研究信息充分、追求利润最大化的中介如何通过推荐企业来引导消费者，发现引导行为会提高佣金和价格，消费者仅在搜索成本足够高时受益，且竞争加剧反而推高价格。
We explore the implications of steering by an informed profit-maximizing intermediary. The intermediary steers consumers by recommending firms, taking into account both the commissions firms offer and the prices they set. Such steering results in higher commissions and consumer prices, so that consumers only benefit from intermediation when their search cost is sufficiently high. Steering reverses the normal relationship between competition and price, with prices increasing in the number of competing firms. We use the framework to study various policies including commission caps (absolute or relative), commission disclosure, promoting information provision, and penalties for inappropriate advice.