Selective Disclosure, Expertise Acquisition, and Price Informativeness*
研究了公司选择性披露策略如何影响投资者获取专业能力的动机以及市场价格的信息含量，发现向成熟投资者定向选择性披露比公开披露或非定向选择性披露更能促进专业能力获取和价格信息含量。
ABSTRACT We examine how a firm's disclosure‐audience policy affects investors' expertise acquisition and price informativeness in the market. We distinguish the investors' information advantage due to superior access from that due to superior ability to process information. We show that targeted selective disclosure to sophisticated investors may encourage greater expertise acquisition on the part of investors and lead to more informative prices than either public disclosure or untargeted selective disclosure, because the value of expertise is maximized if sophisticated investors gain exclusive information access at a relatively low cost. These results illuminate the persistence of private communications between investors and firms in the post–Regulation Fair Disclosure era and provide implications for regulators in addressing increasing concerns raised about the enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure.