Tractable Model of Dynamic Many-to-Many Matching
构建了一个可处理的动态多对多匹配模型，考虑链接间的支付外部性，发现均衡中匹配数量过少，并比较了可转移与不可转移效用版本的等价性。
We develop a tractable, dynamic, and strategic model of many-to-many matching with payoff externalities across links. The joint dynamic surplus or certain second properties of individual utilities, like payoff externalities, can typically be identified. We characterize a class of interior equilibria as solutions to an optimization problem with an objective function that consists of welfare minus an inefficiency loss term. In equilibrium, too few matches are formed. We compare transferable and nontransferable versions of the model; the equilibria of the two versions are equivalent up to a rescaling of parameters. We describe the asymptotic limits of disappearing frictions.