Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
研究了n位专家从候选人中选出一名获胜者的社会选择规则，给出了在占优策略下实施该规则的充要条件，并证明多数配额规则不满足该条件。
A group of n experts has to pick one winner from a group of candidates. Each expert has a judgment about who is the best candidate. A social choice rule (SCR) is a function that aggregates experts’ judgments to determine the deserving winner. Experts may be biased and not want to reveal their judgments. We state a necessary and sufficient condition for implementing an SCR in dominant strategies. We show that no q-supermajoritarian SCR with q≤n−1 or q-submajoritarian SCR with q≥2 satisfies this condition.