CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation) Market and Corporate Lending
研究银行在遭遇负面冲击后，能否通过参与CLO市场（作为抵押品管理人或承销商）来维持企业贷款发放，发现CLO渠道使银行转向可证券化的贷款类型并减少表内风险。
Abstract We investigate whether access to the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) market as collateral managers or underwriters affects lenders' ability to overcome an idiosyncratic adverse shock in the corporate lending market. In a triple difference‐in‐differences setting, we find that lenders decrease their origination of loans following a negative shock; however, those with CLO access become more likely to arrange deals with securitizable facilities (Term B). Moreover, they choose to arrange deals with smaller size on‐balance‐sheet lending (Term A). The results suggest that securitization is actively used by lenders to switch to off‐balance‐sheet lending and to reduce the risk retained on the balance sheet.