Stewardship Signaling and Use of Social Pressure to Reduce Nonpoint Source Pollution
通过实验室实验，研究了管理信号和社会压力如何影响农民采用污染减排技术，发现两者均能促进技术采用，但对社会净效益的影响取决于技术成本与污染减排的经济收益。
Nonpoint source pollution persists in agricultural landscapes, and policy makers are increasingly interested in opportunities to reduce pollution using behavioral approaches in lieu of regulations or increased financial incentives. We use a laboratory experiment to analyze how stewardship signaling and social pressure affect management decisions with environmental consequences. We find that stewardship signaling and, to some extent, social pressures increase adoption of a pollution-abatement technology, but the effect on social net benefit depends on the relative cost of technology adoption and the economic benefits of pollution reduction. Our results have implications for agri-environmental programs that publicly recognize environmental stewardship.