Persistency of window dressing practices in the U.S. repo markets after the GFC: The unexplored role of the deposit insurance premium
研究了全球金融危机后监管改进是否有效限制了美国银行通过回购进行的季度末窗口粉饰，发现巴塞尔III严格应用消除了部分动机，但存款保险费率计算仍促使银行继续该行为。
Abstract We investigate whether the regulatory improvements made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis have been effective in limiting bank downward window dressing by means of repos in the United States. We find that a strict application of the Basel III regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at quarter‐end. We also show that the persistency of window dressing is related to the computation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment base, which motivates banks to engage in window dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium.