Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis
对多维私人信息下的合同拍卖进行结构分析，以路易斯安那州石油租约的现金-特许权拍卖为例，发现其政府收入更差、开发率不优于固定特许权的现金拍卖，修正了关于多维拍卖最优性的传统观点。
In this paper, we conduct a structural analysis of multi-attribute auctions of contracts with a general allocation rule when private information is multidimensional. Upon modeling bidders’ contract value that accounts for their endogenous ex post actions, we nonparametrically identify bidders’ private information from their bids and estimate their joint distribution. Analyzing cash-royalty auctions of Louisiana oil leases, we find government revenue worse and development rates no better than in a cash auction with a fixed royalty in view of adverse selection and moral hazard. Our findings revise conventional wisdom on the optimality of multi-attribute auctions.