Social capital and managerial opportunism: Evidence from option backdating
研究发现，企业所在地区的社会资本越高，管理者进行期权回溯（一种自利行为）的可能性和程度越低，且高管和董事在期权回溯后被解职的速度越快，说明社区规范能通过加重自利行为的后果来约束企业行为。
Abstract Social capital potentially influences corporate outcomes by reducing the likelihood of managerial self‐serving behavior. This expectation follows from the likelihood that the consequences of self‐serving behavior are severe for firms in high‐social‐capital areas. Thus, we employ a sample of firms that backdated option grants to examine these propositions. Accordingly, we find a negative and significant relation between social capital and the probability and magnitude of backdating. Furthermore, we find a positive and significant relation between social capital and likelihood, as well as between the speed of the termination of senior executives and board members following option backdating. Notably, we find evidence for the notion that community norms can influence corporate behavior by creating an environment where self‐serving or bad behavior has severe consequences.