Staggered boards and product innovations: Evidence from Massachusetts State Bill HB 5640
利用马萨诸塞州1990年一项强制采用交错董事会的法案作为自然实验，发现该治理结构能提升高科技企业的产品创新，尤其对易被收购、机构持股高或广告投入大的行业效果更明显。
In this paper, we empirically investigate how staggered boards, a prevailing governance structure of high-tech firms, influence firms’ product innovations in the United States. We explore a quasi-natural experiment of a legislation change in Massachusetts that forced the adoption of staggered boards in 1990 for the causal effect of staggered boards. We find that, when compared with firms in other states, Massachusetts-incorporated firms without staggered boards before 1990 perform better with respect to product innovations once they adopt staggered boards after 1990. The positive effect of staggered boards on product innovations is stronger for firms with higher takeover vulnerability, with higher institutional ownership, and in industries with higher advertising expenditures. Such a positive effect is consistent with staggered boards’ long-term orientation and is further confirmed by treated firms’ better product quality after 1990.