Recommendations with Feedback
研究了推荐者关心准确性且其推荐影响产品质量时的战略作用，发现推荐具有自我实现性，会导致信息获取激励不足、现状偏见和回避风险创新等问题，而企业付费可缓解这些低效。
Abstract We investigate the strategic role of a recommender who cares about accuracy and whose recommendations influence product quality. In the presence of such feedback effects, recommendations have a self-fulling property: the recommendation agent can select any firm that will end up being the firm with the best quality. This produces important inefficiencies that include (a) a lack of incentive to acquire valuable information, (b) a status quo bias, and (c) the avoidance of risky innovations. Monetary payments from firms may work in mitigating these inefficiencies, while competition between recommenders and monetary payments from consumers are ineffective.