Careers in arm’s-length contracting: evidence from the Chilean wine-grape market
研究了酿酒厂与独立葡萄种植户之间的短期合同如何作为长期合同的筛选阶段，发现市场隐含的晋升激励在保持距离型采购合同中同样重要。
Abstract This paper investigates the presence of career and promotion-based incentives in the context of arm’s-length contracting between wineries and independent wine-grape farmers. We hypothesise that long-term contracts represent a stage in a farmer’s career after a series of short-term contracts. We develop a conceptual framework to frame the interaction between explicit performance incentives and implicit career incentives arising from the possibility of promotion to a long-term contract, conditional on wineries learning a farmer’s potential for superior-quality production. Based on data from Chilean wine-grape farmers, we find evidence suggesting that implicit market-based incentives, usually studied in the context of employment contracts, are also important in arm’s-length contracts used in procurement of farm output.