Unintended Consequences of the Dodd–Frank Act on Credit Rating Risk and Corporate Finance
研究发现多德-弗兰克法案对评级机构的监管增加了企业评级下调风险，导致低评级企业减少债务发行和投资，产生负面溢出效应。
Abstract Prior research finds that Dodd–Frank Act’s regulations on credit rating agencies (CRAs) increase rated firms’ risk of rating downgrades, regardless of their credit quality. Our difference-in-difference estimates suggest that after Dodd–Frank, low-rated firms, which face steep costs from a further downgrade, significantly reduce their debt issuance and investments compared to similar unrated firms. Our results are not driven by credit supply or the financial crisis. They reveal an unintended consequence of Dodd–Frank: Greater regulatory pressure on CRAs leads to negative spillover effects on firms concerned about credit ratings, regardless of their credit quality.