Not Too Much, Not Too Little: Centralization, Decentralization, and Organizational Change
基于美国中等和大型城市政府的全国调查数据，使用有序概率模型检验集权程度对四种组织变革实施的影响，发现适度集权与适度分权对不同变革类型有不同作用，挑战了集权与分权二元对立的传统观点。
Abstract The outcomes of centralized or decentralized decision making in public organizations have been a subject of intense debate in the literature for more than a century now. This study revisits this debate by examining whether the degree of centralization influences the implementation of four types of organizational changes: reorganization, service contracting, technology adoption, and performance information use. We conceive of organizational decision making as a ladder—at one end is a very centralized approach where the chief executive primarily makes all major decisions, and at the opposite end is a highly decentralized approach where lower-level employees participate in shaping strategic decisions. Using the results from a national survey of midsized and large city governments, the ordered probit regressions, and additional robustness tests, show that moderation matters more than the polar ends. Moreover, moderate centralization and decentralization have distinct influences on the implementation of different types of organizational change. The findings challenge the conventional thinking that the choice between centralization or decentralization is binary, where one structure is always better than the other. Consistent with contingency theory, public organizations demonstrate strategic behavior in the choice of decision-making structure to adapt to environmental and organizational contingencies.