Bond covenants and investment policy
研究发现债券契约中的投资和融资限制会影响企业的资本支出，尤其对财务受限或过度投资的企业影响更大，有助于缓解投资扭曲的代理问题。
Abstract I provide evidence that covenants in bond indentures affect firms’ investment policies outside of covenant violations. After controlling for the self‐selectivity of covenant inclusion, I find that firms decrease (increase) capital expenditure after issuing bonds with investment (financing) restrictions. Firms that are more financially constrained or overinvesting are the most affected by investment restrictions, whereas only underinvesting firms see a positive effect from financing restrictions. My results provide empirical evidence that bond covenants help mitigate agency problems related to investment distortions, and especially that covenants restricting financing activities can alleviate the underinvestment problem.