Are Marriage-Related Taxes and Social Security Benefits Holding Back Female Labour Supply?
研究美国婚姻相关的税收和社保福利对女性劳动力供给的影响，通过动态生命周期模型估计发现，取消这些规定会大幅提高已婚女性的劳动参与率并带来福利改善。
Abstract In the US, both taxes and old-age social security benefits depend on one’s marital status and tend to reduce the labour supply of the secondary earner. To what extent are these provisions holding back the female labour supply? We estimate a rich dynamic life-cycle model of labour supply and savings for couples and singles using the Method of Simulated Moments for the 1945 and 1955 birth cohorts. Our model matches well the life-cycle profiles of labour market participation, hours, and savings for married and single people, and generates plausible elasticities of labour supply. It implies that eliminating these marriage-related provisions would drastically increase the participation of married women over their entire life cycle, reduce the participation of married men after age 60, and increase savings. If the resulting government surplus were used to lower income taxation, there would be large welfare gains for the vast majority of the population. These results hold for both cohorts, including the later one, which has participation similar to that of more recent generations.