Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from U.S. Cross-Listing
利用51国企业样本和双重差分法，研究发现美国交叉上市后企业避税行为减少，尤其在公司治理改善显著、股东保护较弱国家的企业中更明显，表明交叉上市有助于协调经理与股东利益。
ABSTRACT Using a sample of firms from 51 countries and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits corporate governance shocks induced by cross-listing in the U.S., we find that firms tend to engage in less tax avoidance after cross-listing. This effect is more pronounced for firms that experience significant improvements in corporate governance, and for firms from countries with weaker shareholder protection and disclosure requirements. Taken together, the results indicate that cross-listing in the U.S. helps align the interests of managers and shareholders and reduces managerial diversion. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; G18; G32; G34; G35.