Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
研究了雇主和工人各自的生产率冲击如何传导至收入和就业，利用瑞典雇主-雇员匹配数据估计模型，发现企业吸收了部分冲击，且政府保险的30%被企业保险挤出。
This paper examines how employer- and worker-specific productivity shocks transmit to earnings and employment. We develop an equilibrium search model and characterize the optimal contract offered by firms. Risk-neutral firms provide partial insurance against shocks to risk-averse workers and offer contingent contracts, where payments are backloaded in good times and frontloaded in bad times. The model is estimated on matched employer-employee data from Sweden. Firms absorb persistent worker and firm shocks, with respective passthrough values of 26 and 10 percent. We evaluate the effects of redistributive policies and find that 30 percent of government insurance is undone by crowding out firm insurance.