Misconduct risks, legal enforcement and venture capital networks
研究公共执行和私人执行对风险投资联合投资网络形成的不同影响，发现公共执行因不当行为风险抑制网络密度，而私人执行在特定文化条件下促进网络密度。
Abstract This study investigates the differing role of enforcement on the formation of venture capital (VC) syndication networks. We conjecture that public enforcement, with strong investigative powers against any syndicate member, discourages the formation of denser syndication networks due to misconduct risk by a member. By contrast, private enforcement, with strong disclosure and liability standards, enables denser syndication networks, through clear liability rules, standardized securities contracts and cost‐sharing amongst syndicate members. Our VC data from 31 countries show a negative impact of public enforcement on VC networks and partially support the positive impact of private enforcement depending on cultural conditions.