Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders
通过分析华盛顿州双重职业者的数据，检验工资是雇主发布还是通过谈判决定，发现低工资部分符合发布模式，高工资部分符合谈判模式。
We employ a revealed preference test to distinguish between wage posting and wage bargaining. Using a sample of dual jobholders in Washington State, we estimate the sensitivity of wages and separation rates to wage shocks in a secondary job. In lower parts of the wage distribution, improvements in the outside option lead to higher separations rates but not to higher wages, consistent with wage posting. In the highest wage quartile, improved outside options translate to higher wages but not higher separation rates, consistent with bargaining. In the aggregate, bargaining appears to be a limited determinant of wage setting.