Collateral Constraints, Financial Constraints, and Risk Management: Evidence From Anti-Recharacterization Laws
利用美国各州反重新定性法律的交错实施作为外生冲击，研究抵押品价值如何影响企业的对冲决策，发现法律实施后企业增加了商品、外汇和利率对冲，但融资约束强的企业效果较弱。
Abstract We use the staggered enactment of anti-recharacterization laws as a plausibly exogenous shock to the value of securitizing collateral through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and test how collateral values impact corporate risk management. Following the laws’ enactment, we find increases in commodity, foreign exchange, and interest rate hedging, especially for firms with exposure to these risks and that rely on SPVs. Supporting the collateral constraints literature, the effect is weaker for firms that likely need the collateral for external financing, such as financially constrained firms. Our findings highlight fluctuations in collateral values as an important consideration in risk management decisions.