Why Do Large Positive Non-GAAP Earnings Adjustments Predict Abnormally High CEO Pay?
研究发现，标普500公司中非GAAP盈利远高于GAAP盈利时，CEO会获得大量无法解释的薪酬，且这些公司业绩较差、CEO权力较弱，非GAAP盈利被用作高薪的正当理由，但股东和媒体异议较少。
ABSTRACT CEOs of S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings receive substantial unexplained pay. Crucially, this result remains even after controlling for the level of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings. These firms are relatively poor performers (i.e., low GAAP earnings and stock returns) and have less powerful CEOs, consistent with non-GAAP earnings being used as justification when high executive pay is more likely to cause outrage. Additionally, despite the lower GAAP and return performance, these firms are more likely to beat the earnings targets specified in their compensation plans, which likely increases investors' perceptions of core operating earnings and reduces outrage. Indeed, these firms face less dissent from shareholders and proxy advisors, and no additional media scrutiny. Our evidence suggests that the fraction of CEO pay that seems attributable to opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, while limited, is economically meaningful. JEL Classifications: G14; G34; G38; M12; M41.