Indirect Evergreening Using Related Parties: Evidence From India
研究发现印度银行通过向破产借款人的关联方放贷、再由关联方通过内部资本市场转移资金，实现间接续贷，这种操作更难被审计发现，并对企业和行业产生实际影响。
Abstract We identify a novel way of evergreening loans in India. A low-quality bank lends to a related party of an insolvent borrower, and the loan recipient transfers the funds to the insolvent borrower using internal capital markets. Incremental investments, interest rates charged, and loan delinquency rates collectively indicate evergreening. These loans are unlikely to represent arm’s length transactions or rescue of troubled related firms by stronger firms to prevent group-wide spillover effects. Indirect evergreening is less likely to be detected by regulatory audits. It has significant real consequences at the firm and industry levels.