Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
研究了在信息获取成本高昂的环境中，随机序列独裁机制如何通过影响代理人对选择集的信念来改变均衡结果，并发现信息披露可能导致低效率，而信息设计能促进更有效的信息获取。
We consider matching-mechanism design in an environment in which agents acquire information about their preferences endogenously. Information is costly; thus, agents acquire information only if it is relevant to their decision-making. Agents' beliefs about their choice set (i.e., the set of objects each agent can obtain) are therefore crucial for incentives in information acquisition. This study demonstrates that the implementation of matching mechanisms changes the equilibrium consequence because it influences agents' beliefs about choice sets. We analyze the behavior of the random serial dictatorship mechanism in a stylized environment. We construct a family of economies in which agents have independent and private values but information disclosure about choice sets leads to inefficient outcome. We induce more efficient information acquisition through information design.