Boards of a Feather: Homophily in Foreign Director Appointments Around the World
研究发现，公司所在国与董事母国之间的制度、法律和社会相似性（即国家配对同质性）显著影响外国董事的任命，且这种同质性可能限制高质量治理国家董事向低质量治理国家公司的流动，从而削弱董事会国际化对全球治理实践趋同的推动作用。
ABSTRACT We examine how similarity in institutional, legal, and social characteristics between a firm's and its directors’ home countries, that is, country‐pair homophily, affects foreign director appointments. We estimate a gravity model that includes economic and geographic proximity and find that country‐pair homophily is a significant determinant of foreign director appointments to corporate boards. We also find that country‐pair homophily limits the appointments of foreign directors from high‐quality governance countries to firms located in low‐quality governance countries, which may reduce the role of board internationalization in promoting the global convergence of governance practices. We analyze changes in foreign director appointments around the international adoption of IFRS and Norway's gender‐quota rule and find a higher appointment likelihood for directors originating from countries that are institutionally and culturally similar to that of the firm. Our findings point to the critical role that country‐pair homophily plays in matching director to boards with implications for the diffusion of governance practices globally.