Vertical Contracts with Endogenous Product Selection: An Empirical Analysis of Vendor Allowance Contracts
研究供应商向零售商提供一次性补贴（供应商补贴）如何影响产品选择和定价，利用零售商更换供应商的威胁来推断未观测到的补贴，发现补贴既有扭曲产品选择的负面效应，也可能带来定价方面的正面效应。
Producers frequently provide retailers with financial incentives to secure product distribution. These payments often take the form of vendor allowances: lump-sum transfers to retailers that do not directly depend on quantity sold. I introduce an estimation strategy that uses observed product selections to inform unobserved allowances. I use retailers’ replacement threats, which may allow them to capture both vendor transfers and lower wholesale prices. A counterfactual restricts firms to contract on only wholesale prices. Results show that vendor allowances may have not only (negative) product distortion effects but also (potentially positive) pricing effects.