无限重复博弈中的匹配长度实现与合作

Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games

Journal of Economic Theory · 2022
被引 14
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

基于无限重复囚徒困境实验的元数据,发现早期匹配的实际长度显著影响后续合作率,并估计出符合“练习幂律”的学习模型,对理解学习和实验设计有启示。

Abstract

Experimental studies of infinitely repeated games typically consist of several indefinitely repeated games (“matches”) played in sequence with different partners each time, whereby match length, i.e. the number of stages of each game is randomly determined. Using a large meta data set on indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018) we demonstrate that the realized length of early matches has a substantial impact on cooperation rates in subsequent matches. We estimate simple learning models displaying the “power law of practice” and show that participants do learn from match length realization. We then study three cases from the literature where realized match length has a strong impact on treatment comparisons, both in terms of the size and the direction of the treatment effect. These results have important implications for our understanding of how people learn in infinitely repeated games as well as for experimental design.

无限重复博弈合作匹配长度学习效应