Does CEO Succession Planning (Disclosure) Create Shareholder Value?
研究发现，披露详细CEO继任规划的代理声明发布后，公司平均累计异常收益显著为正，表明继任规划创造价值，但仅对大型、复杂、稳定的公司有效，对小型、简单、不稳定的公司反而降低价值。
Abstract Average cumulative abnormal returns around proxy statements containing “in-depth” disclosures of planning for CEO succession are significantly positive indicating that succession planning is a value-added undertaking. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment based on a 2009 SEC ruling that induced more succession planning disclosures, we find that succession planning is not value-adding for all firms. Rather, succession planning is value-enhancing for larger, more complex, and more stable firms. Importantly, CEO succession planning appears to be value reducing for smaller, simpler, and less stable firms.