Should Central Banks Issue Digital Currency?
研究央行发行数字货币如何影响经济均衡和福利，发现其可能改善交易效率但会挤占银行存款、推高银行融资成本并减少投资，分析了定向数字货币和通用数字货币的政策权衡。
Abstract We study how introducing a central bank digital currency affects equilibrium allocations and welfare in an environment where both currency and bank deposits are used in exchange. We highlight an important policy tradeoff: while a digital currency tends to improve efficiency in exchange, it may also crowd out bank deposits, raise banks’ funding costs, and decrease investment. We derive conditions under which targeted digital currencies, which compete only with physical currency or only with bank deposits, raise welfare. If such targeted currencies are infeasible, we illustrate the policy tradeoffs that arise when issuing a single, universal digital currency.