CEO Marketability, Employment Opportunities, and Compensation: Evidence from Compensation Peer Citations
研究发现，CEO被列为薪酬同行（尤其是被大公司引用）预示着更好的外部就业机会，这些CEO更可能离职或获得加薪，且股权奖励的归属期更短，表明披露要求增强了劳动力市场透明度并推高了CEO薪酬。
Abstract Mandatory disclosure of CEO compensation peers signals potential outside opportunities for the cited CEOs by revealing which companies view them as viable executive candidates. CEOs cited often as compensation peers (especially by larger firms, which represent attractive employment opportunities) are more likely to leave for better positions or receive compensation increases. Equity-based awards following cites by larger firms have shorter vesting periods, suggesting these CEOs gain negotiating power relative to their boards. The disclosure requirement enhanced labor market transparency and led to higher compensation for highly cited CEOs without penalizing less cited CEOs, putting upward pressure on CEO compensation.