Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers
研究策略性买家行为如何影响动态价格竞争均衡，发现当买家预期分享未来剩余时，许多仅考虑即时收益的均衡被消除，长期市场竞争更可能维持，对反垄断政策有启示。
We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition.