The Economic Consequences of Financial Audit Regulation in the Charitable Sector
研究了慈善部门财务审计强制要求对捐赠行为的影响，发现审计降低了捐赠者对慈善机构声誉的依赖，使捐赠更分散，并提高了捐赠者比例，但对总捐款额的影响仅在高信息不对称的慈善机构中显著。
ABSTRACT I provide evidence on the effects of financial audit mandates in the charitable sector, in particular their influence on donor behavior. My empirical strategy relies on variation in size‐based exemption thresholds across states and differences in size driven by the nature of charities’ activities. Consistent with audit mandates reducing donors’ reliance on charity reputation, I find audit mandates are associated with a lower concentration of donations on the largest, most well‐known charities. I show this reallocation of resources allows the charitable sector to serve more diverse geographic areas and social needs. In terms of the effect on willingness to give, I document that audit mandates are associated with a higher proportion of taxpayers who donate. However, I only observe a sizable impact on total contributions in dollars for charities with high inherent information asymmetry. Collectively, these results suggest financial audit regulation reduces information frictions and thereby affects resource allocation in the market for charitable giving.