The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and Wages under Information Frictions
提出工人对经济状况信息不完全是工资调整缓慢的新机制，解释为何工资对正向冲击反应滞后，模型能同时匹配劳动力市场波动及工资、就业机会成本对生产率的弹性数据。
I propose a new mechanism for sluggish wages based on workers’ noisy information about the state of the economy. Wages do not respond immediately to a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages. The model is robust to two major criticisms of existing theories of sluggish wages and volatile unemployment, namely, that wages are flexible for new hires and the flow opportunity cost of employment (FOCE) is pro-cyclicality. The model generates volatility in the labor market as well as wage and FOCE elasticities with respect to productivity, consistent with the data.