Bank Resolution, Regulatory Arbitrage, and Systemic Risk
研究了银行处置改革对大型金融集团系统性风险的影响，发现发达国家母行在更严格处置制度下系统性风险贡献降低，而发展中国家相反，表明监管套利和执法力度差异是关键因素。
Are bank resolution regimes effective enough to improve financial stability? We look at the effect of the new bank resolution reforms on the systemic risk of big financial conglomerates. We find that in developed countries, parent banks in a stricter resolution regime have lower systemic risk contributions, compared to their foreign subsidiaries. The opposite is true for parent banks from developing countries. We explain these results as financial conglomerates exploiting differences in resolution tools between parent and subsidiary banks, in particular in developing countries where rule enforcement is weaker. These results suggest that centralized regulation has heterogeneous effects depending on the country's development degree. Only the bail-in tool reduces systemic risk across the board, which has important implications for policymakers.