MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS
研究了当个人投入不可观察时，团队能否通过自我施加的集体惩罚来防止搭便车，发现只有在成员对偷懒和团队产出的偏好不可分离时，低报绩效的威胁才能改善福利，表明自我评估可替代远程工作中的管理监控。
Abstract We reexamine the ability of teams to credibly self‐impose group punishments and prevent free riding when individual inputs are unobservable. We formulate self‐imposed group punishments as performance underreporting by the team. Although underreporting is not credible in a static game, we show that simple strategies can sustain underreporting in a repeated game, and that the threat of underreporting improves welfare only if team members' preferences between shirking and team output consumption are nonseparable. Our results suggest that self‐assessments can replace increased managerial monitoring in remote work environments.