Winning connections? Special interests and the sale of failed banks
研究了2007至2016年间美国FDIC拍卖失败银行时，游说监管者的投标银行更易中标，但导致FDIC损失更大，且中标后整合表现更差，说明特殊利益干扰了银行的有效分配。
We study how banks’ special interests affect the resolution of failed banks. Using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2016, we find that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. However, the FDIC incurs larger costs in such auctions, amounting to 24.8 percent of the total resolution losses. We also show that lobbying winners match less well with acquired banks and display worse post-acquisition performance than their non-lobbying counterparts, suggesting that lobbying interferes with an efficient allocation of failed banks. Our results provide new insights into the bank resolution process and the role of special interests.