Wage‐setting coordination in a small open economy*
研究小型开放经济中两个部门工会的工资协调，发现开放经济下工会可考虑外部性提高福利，但部门间策略互动会削弱这一收益，而工资规范虽减少策略互动却因阻碍部门特定调整造成福利损失。
Abstract This paper studies wage‐setting coordination in a two‐sector, open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Two large sectoral unions anticipate the effects of their wage demands on aggregate variables. In an open economy, there are externalities that the unions can take into account to increase aggregate welfare, but the strategic interaction between the sectoral unions tends to erode this gain. When wage coordination takes place through a wage norm set by either of the sectors, this minimizes the strategic interaction. However, wage norms create welfare losses as sector‐specific wage adjustment is required to make an efficient adjustment to shocks.