Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions
研究了在政治寻租和市场势力并存时，总量控制与交易市场的效率问题，发现监管者对寻租的敏感度会影响许可证配置的边际无效率。
Abstract This article investigates cap-and-trade markets in the presence of both political and market distortions. We create a model where dominant firms have the ability to rent seek for a share of pollution permits as well as influence the market equilibrium with their choice of permit exchange because of market power. We derive the equilibrium and show the interaction of these two distortions has consequences for the resulting marginal inefficiency—the extent to which a re-allocation of permits between firms can reduce equilibrium abatement costs. We find that if the regulator is not very responsive to rent seeking then marginal inefficiency reduces relative to the case without rent seeking. When the regulator is very responsive to rent seeking, if dominant rent-seeking firms are all permit buyers (sellers) then marginal inefficiency reduces (increases) relative to the case without rent seeking.