Modelling the Great Recession as a Bank Panic: Challenges
指出将大萧条归因于纯粹恐慌性银行挤兑面临两大挑战：一是阻止新资本进入受挤兑行业的成本高得不合理，二是恐慌均衡的存在性等特征对银行进入假设的微小技术变化高度敏感。
We highlight two challenges for the notion that a pure panic bank run played an important role in the dynamics in the Great Recession. First, the conclusion depends critically on ruling out any entry of new net worth into a sector experiencing a run. We find that the implied cost of entry is implausibly large, across a range of pure panic models. Second, we show that the qualitative features of run equilibria (their existence, how many there are, etc.) are highly sensitive to minor technical changes in assumptions about banker entry. We report another result that is of independent interest. In particular, we describe implementation problems associated with standard macroprudential policy tools for reducing the risk of bank panic.