Capital structure irrelevance in the laboratory: an experiment with complete and asymmetric information
通过实验室交易实验，检验资本结构无关性理论，发现公开信息下理论成立但理性预期估值被拒绝，私有信息下价格更符合先验信息均衡。
Abstract This article presents a laboratory experiment about capital structure irrelevance. The equity and debt issued by a firm are traded in two double-auction markets. In the Public treatment a signal carrying information about the firm’s value is known to all traders, while in the Private treatment, it is only disclosed to some randomly chosen participants. In treatment Public the conditions for capital structure irrelevance hold. The experimental results support the irrelevance of the capital structure but reject the rational expectations (risk-neutral) valuation. Treatment effects are significant and information is more efficiently embedded in prices in the Public treatment. The results from treatment Private on prices support the prior information over the rational expectations equilibrium. The analysis of the final portfolios of informed and uninformed participants suggests incomplete adjustment towards the prior information equilibrium predicted holdings.