Differences in Governance Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences
构建了一个随少数股东保护增强而提高的公司治理指数，发现仅12.68%的外国公司指数高于匹配的美国公司，且外国公司价值随指数相对下降而降低，表明国家层面投资者保护不足使外国公司治理投入低于美国公司。
We construct a firm-level governance index that increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared with U.S. matching firms, only 12.68% of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases relative to the index of matching U.S. firms. Our results suggest that lower country-level investor protection and other country characteristics make it suboptimal for foreign firms to invest as much in governance as U.S. firms do. Overall, we find that minority shareholders benefit from governance improvements and do so partly at the expense of controlling shareholders. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.