Sustainable debt
证明，仅凭声誉就能维持债务的可持续性，无需抵押或法律制裁。在不完全资产市场中，当利率低于经济增长率时，借贷比自我保险更便宜，还款通过失去债务风险共担优势的隐性威胁来强制执行。
We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the economy, self‐insurance is more costly than borrowing, and repayments on loans are enforced by the implicit threat of loss of the risk‐sharing advantages of debt contracts. Private debt credibly circulates as a form of inside money, and it is not valued as a speculative bubble. Competitive equilibria with self‐enforcing debt exist under a suitable hypothesis of gains from trade.