Plural Governance in Industrial Purchasing
研究企业同时使用市场合同和垂直整合进行同一交易的混合治理现象，探讨其动机及两种治理形式的相互影响，基于代理理论和信息经济学，发现混合治理可解决买卖双方的信息不对称问题。
This article examines the phenomenon of plural governance, a firm's simultaneous use of market contracting and vertical integration for the same basic transaction. The author studies two particular aspects of plural governance, namely the conditions that motivate firms to deploy plural governance and the manner in which one governance form influences the other when the two coexist in a joint structure. Drawing on agency theory and information economics, the author develops a set of research hypotheses and tests them empirically in the context of industrial purchasing decisions. The results suggest that the plural governance phenomenon can be understood from the perspective of solving information asymmetry problems between buyers and suppliers. The author discusses the implications of a “make and buy” approach to extant theory of interfirm governance, relationship management, and marketing strategy in business-to-business settings.