Making Partner*
研究律师事务所、咨询公司等机构中，员工为成为合伙人而追求声誉和财务资源时，如何影响其业务风险策略和执行努力。发现声誉好的员工会承担高风险以保护声誉，且开放合伙人职位会降低顶尖员工的努力激励。
Abstract Associates need reputation and financial resources to make partner at law firms, consultancies, and venture capital organizations. We provide a theory for how this prospect influences the business risk strategy they pursue and their execution effort. In our model, business risk affects how reputation evolves and the benchmark reputation for making partner through the impact of execution effort on the financial resources accumulated. We show that when business risk is observable, associates with good reputation take on high business risk, as opposed to low business risk, in order to protect their reputation. We also show that opening partner positions decreases the effort incentives of the associates with the best reputation. Finally, we conjecture that wage dispersion at the associate level should be higher when business risk is unobservable.