Judicial Auditing
本文构建了一个分析司法审计层级体系的简单框架，聚焦于下级决策不精确和意识形态偏见这两个主要原因，并比较了它们如何导致不同的审计和推翻行为。
This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lowerechelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded review/reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be contingent on the first mover's chosen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive theories of jurisprudence. Our analysis also suggests that political “diversity” among initial decision makers (in addition to its other laudable goals) may be an important and generally underappreciated means for economizing on judicial administrative costs.