Impressionable Voters
提出易受印象影响的选民模型，发现两候选人选举中这类选民会选择最大化功利福利的候选人，多候选人选举中若多数选民能区分候选人则孔多塞胜者当选，且该模型可能比理性选民模型有更好的规范性。
We propose a model of impressionable voters. Impressionable voters vote based on impressions rather than maximizing expected utility. We apply our model to elections with multiple candidates and solve for the stationary distributions of the implied stochastic process. In elections with two candidates, we find that impressionable voters select the candidate that maximizes utilitarian welfare. In multi-candidate elections, Condorcet winners are elected provided that a majority of voters is able to sufficiently distinguish competing candidates. In such cases, models with impressionable voters may have better normative properties than models with rational voters.