Adverse Specialization
分析了一个多活动委托代理模型，其中活动对代理人可替代、对委托人互补。最优薪酬需使代理人视活动为互补，通常采用非单调方案，以多维度成功作为高额奖励的唯一来源，并讨论了实证含义与职业薪酬应用。
We analyze a multiple-activity, principal-agent model in which the activities are naturally substitutable for the agent and complementary for the principal. A basic result is that the optimal compensation must cause the agent to view the activities as complements. This complementarity is achieved by employing a compensation scheme that is typically nonmonotone and makes success on multiple dimensions the sole source of large rewards. A number of empirical implications follow, along with explanations for some existing empirical findings. We also discuss applications to compensation in specific occupations.