Competitive foreclosure
研究了寡头垄断企业如何在分散化市场中竞争有限供应的投入品，发现封锁下游竞争对手的动机导致投入品价格和总采购量上升，可能恢复效率，但也可能造成过剩供给和更高价格。
Abstract We model oligopolistic firms, producing substitutes, who compete for inputs from capacity constrained suppliers in a decentralized market. Compared to a price‐taking input market, the incentive to foreclose downstream competitors leads to higher input prices and to a higher aggregate amount of input acquired. This novel feature mitigates the output reducing effect of downstream market power and may even restore efficiency in the unique (input) market clearing equilibrium. Other equilibria, where firms coordinate on which suppliers to target, result in excess supply (involuntary unemployment, if input is labor) and even higher input prices. Our insights generalize to alternative vertical structures.