Revision Games
提出一类称为修订博弈的博弈模型，玩家在截止日期前随机获得修订机会并相互监督，发现最优均衡下的合作行为可由简单微分方程描述，并应用于股市开盘前活动和选举活动。
This paper proposes a class of games called revision games . In a revision game, players start with initially prepared actions, followed by a sequence of random revision opportunities until a predetermined deadline. In the course of revisions, players monitor each other's behavior. It is shown that players can cooperate and that their behavior under the optimal equilibrium is described by a simple differential equation. We present the necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation to be sustained in revision games. We also present applications to the preopening activities in the stock exchange and to an electoral campaign.